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ABSTRACT
This paper uses a new dataset to study the relationship between economic output and sovereign
default for the period 1820-2004. We ￿nd a negative but surprisingly weak relationship between
output and default. Throughout history, countries have indeed defaulted during bad times (when
output was relatively low), but they have also maintained debt service in the face of severe adverse
shocks, and they have defaulted when domestic economic conditions were favorable. We show that
this constitutes a puzzle for standard theories, which predict a much tighter negative relationship
as default provides partial insurance against declines in output.
￿We thank Gita Gopinath for sharing her MATLAB code, and Cristina Arellano, Aart Kraay, Guido Sandleris
and Jeromin Zettlemeyer for helpful comments. Further comments welcome. A shorter version of this paper
appeared as: Michael Tomz and Mark L. J. Wright. 2007. "Do Countries Default in "Bad Times"?" Journal
of the European Economic Association, 5:2-3, pp. 352-60.1. Introduction
What is the relationship between sovereign default and economic activity in the de-
faulting country? Do sovereign countries default only in ￿bad times,￿when output is low?
The answers to these questions are instructive as to whether sovereign default is a purely op-
portunistic phenomenon, in which a sovereign seizes the most resources for itself, or whether
default conveys partial insurance against adverse economic outcomes. In turn, these issues
have implications for the welfare e⁄ects of changing how supranational institutions and cred-
itor country governments approach debt crises.
Towards an answer to these questions, this paper studies the relationship between
sovereign default and economic activity for the period 1820-2004. Using a new data set of
borrowing, defaults and economic activity, we summarize the relationship between economic
activity and default. We ￿nd that regardless of the measure of association used, there exists
a broad tendency for countries to default more often in ￿bad times￿than in ￿good times.￿
The relationship is weak, however: output often declines without a default being observed,
and countries occasionally default when output is high.
We then contrast these empirical ￿ndings with the predictions of several widely-used
models of sovereign default in the tradition of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). In these models,
markets are incomplete and default acts as a mechanism to provide costly partial insurance
against declines in output. We show that, for a range of parameter values, these models
predict a much stronger relationship between default and economic activity than occurs in
the historical record. Taken together, our ￿ndings are consistent with the coexistence of both
excusable defaults (for insurance purposes) and inexcusable ones (for opportunistic reasons).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our data set and
characterizes the empirical relationship between output and default. Section 3 contrasts this
evidence with the implications of well-known models of default with incomplete markets.
Section 4 concludes. The Appendix describes in more detail the sources and methods used
in constructing our database, and in performing the numerical computations.2. The Empirical Relationship Between Output and Default
In this Section, we outline the main sources and methods used to construct our data-
base of sovereign defaults and economic activity, and describe the methods used to assess the
relationship between defaults and economic activity. Further details on both data construc-
tion and statistical methods have been relegated to the data appendix. We then present our
￿ndings about the historical relationship between economic activity and default.
A. Data
Any study of sovereign defaults must begin with a de￿nition of precisely what is meant
by the term ￿default￿ . A su¢ cient condition for a default to have occurred is that a country
not meet its obligations, either on paying interest or repaying principal, within any grace
period speci￿ed. We also regard a country as having defaulted if it makes an exchange o⁄er
that ￿contains terms less favorable than the original issue￿in the case of sovereign bonds,
or if ￿a rescheduling of principal and/or interest is agreed to by creditors at less favorable
terms than the original loan. Such rescheduling agreements covering short- and long-term
bank debt are considered defaults even where, for legal or regulatory reasons, creditors deem
forced rollover of principal to be voluntary￿(Beers 2004). We restrict attention solely to debts
incurred to private creditors, and thus exclude o¢ cial credits. Consequently, our measure of
default di⁄ers from the dates of Paris Club rescheduling agreements. We also limit attention
to defaults of national governments, and exclude defaults by provinces or cities.
It is also necessary to de￿ne what is meant by the ￿start￿of a default as well as what
sequence of events triggers the ￿end￿of a default. We consider defaults on both interest and
principal of a debt, and date the start of a default to either the date of the ￿rst missed payment
or rescheduling, or the date at which a country announces that it will stop servicing its debts.
A default is de￿ned to have ended when a majority of creditors agrees to a settlement with
the country. A country is de￿ned to be in default in a given year if it was in default for any
month of that year, with the exception of defaults that are settled in January of a given year
which are assumed to imply that the country is not in default for that year. Data on defaults
on bank loans is drawn from Beers (2004), while the dates of defaults on sovereign bonds
2were drawn from Beers (2004) for the modern period, Suter (1990) for the middle decades of
the 20th Century, and from Duggan and Tomz (2006) for the 19th and early 20th Centuries.
By our de￿nition, 106 countries defaulted a total of 250 times since the end of the
Napoleonic Wars. The most common defaulters were Ecuador, Costa Rica, Mexico, Uruguay,
and Venezuela, each of which experienced at least 8 distinct spells of default. Ecuador and
Honduras stand as the most long-standing defaulters; beginning with their initial loans as
members of the Central American Confederation in the 1820s, each has registered nearly 120
years in default. New defaults have occurred in every decade since the 1820s, and they were
most common during the Latin American crisis of the 1980s, when more than 50 countries
(about 40 percent of all nations that owed money to private foreign creditors) failed to pay in
full on time. The largest defaults in present value terms were the Argentine default of 2001,
which was associated with privately held debt instruments with a principal of $90 billion
and was even larger once deferred interest was included, and the Russian repudiation of 1918
which was valued at the time at 1.7 billion pounds sterling (although around half of these
debts were held by other governments, including about 800 million pounds of inter-allied war
debts).
As a measure of economic activity, we employ annual estimates of a country￿ s real
gross domestic product in local currency. For most of the post-war period, we use o¢ cial
estimates as collected by the World Bank and reported in their World Development Indicators
database. These estimates are then extrapolated backwards in time using measures of gross
domestic product collected from a variety of country-speci￿c sources, many (but not all) of
which are collected in the compendia of Maddison (2001) and of the Conference Board and
Groningen Growth and Development Centre (2006).
To measure ￿good￿and ￿bad￿times in economic activity, we construct a measure of
business cycles by comparing actual GDP with Hodrick-Prescott ￿ltered trend GDP. There
is a considerable amount of debate as to which value of the Hodrick-Prescott smoothing
parameter to use with annual data. Following the lead of Dolado, Sebastian and Valles
(1993), Correia, Neves and Rebelo (1992) and Cooley and Ohanian (1991) we focus on a
value of 400, but also verify that our results are robust to using other commonly proposed
values such as 6.25 (Ravn and Uhlig 2004; See also Baxter and King 1999 and Maravall and
3del Rio 2001), and 100 (Backus and Kehoe 1992, Giorno et al. 1995 and European Central
Bank 2000).
In our analysis, we restrict attention to countries that actually owed debts to private
foreign creditors, and therefore had the potential to default. To do this, we obtained estimates
of the stock of debt owed by the government of a country to foreign private sector creditors,
excluding trade creditors, for the period 1970 to the present from the World Bank￿ s Global
Development Finance. These were used to construct an indicator variable for years in which a
country was a debtor, which was then taken back through the interwar period using estimates
of bond issuance from the Adler Sovereign Bond Database. For the period before 1914,
borrowers were identi￿ed through a comprehensive search of archival and secondary sources
for six major capital markets ￿Amsterdam, Berlin, Frankfurt, London, New York, and Paris
￿as discussed in Tomz (2007).
B. Measuring the Relationship Between Output and Default
To begin, we visually examine the data for some well known defaulting countries.
Figure One presents a graph of default dates and business cycles for Chile, a country for
which we have an especially long series of output data. Following the expulsion of Spanish
forces in 1818, Chile was quick to borrow in European ￿nancial markets, and just as quick
to default in 1826. This was followed by three further default episodes in 1880, during the
Great Depression in 1931, and during the Latin American debt crisis in 1983. It is obvious
from the Figure that the relationship between output and default is quite weak. Although
the latter two defaults coincided with very bad times for the Chilean economy, with drops in
output by between 15 and 25 per-cent below trend being recorded, the two earlier episodes
of default began with output above trend and, in the 1880 case, substantially so (more than
10 per-cent above trend). Moreover, there were numerous occasions in which output fell
sharply and Chile did not default: output was more than 20 per-cent below trend in 1921,
and more than 10 per-cent below trend in 1877, 1903 and 1975, and yet in not one of these
cases did Chile default. Nor is this pattern due to the fact that Chile stopped borrowing.
Although we do not have precise ￿gures on the quantities of foreign debt owed by the Chilean
government, we do know that it was an international debtor for the entire period under study,
4and moreover during the years 1865 to 1915 (the golden age of international ￿nance), during
which there were ￿ve sharp economic downtowns (more than ￿ve per-cent below trend) but
only one default (and that was in a boom year), Chilean debt levels increased steadily.
Figure Two presents a comparable picture for Argentina. Like Chile, Argentina was
quick to both borrow and default in the years after independence in 1816. This was followed
by further defaults in 1890, the Latin American debt crisis in 1982, and again recently in
2001. The last three of these defaults, which are the only ones for which we have output data,
were all associated with economic downturns; thus, unlike the case of Chile, bad economic
conditions appeared to be necessary, if not su¢ cient, for a default to occur in Argentina.
However, during its most severe economic downturns, Argentina did not default. For example,
Argentina￿ s 1890 default coincided closely with a decline in output to 16 per-cent below trend
in 1891, while the 2001 default was associated with output being 13 per-cent below trend in
2002. However, declines in output of 21 per-cent below trend in 1881, 12 per-cent in both
1897 and 1902, 24 per-cent below trend in 1917, nine per-cent in 1932 during the Great
Depression, and 12 per-cent in 1963, did not result in default, despite the fact that Argentina
was one of the world biggest borrowers at both the end of the 19th century and the start of
the 20th. Moreover, default appears to have preceded the worst output falls: the default in
1982 occurred when output was 3 per-cent below trend; it was not until 1985 that output
dropped 9 per-cent below, and not until 1990 that it reached 20 per-cent below trend.
Next we examine whether these patterns hold up more systematically over a larger
sample of countries. Combining our database of economic conditions and market access with
our list of defaults, we have data for 175 sovereign entities covering 169 defaults, which lasted
a total of 1,597 years. Seventy-￿ve countries never defaulted. Although we have data on
output for 13,118 country-years, only 9,244 of these observations coincided with a country
that was a borrower: in some cases we have output data for a country before it borrowed for
the ￿rst time, and in others the country redeemed all of its debts and did not borrow for a
period of time.
As a ￿rst cut, we computed the contemporaneous correlation between our indicator
variable for default, and our measure of the business cycle. As shown in Table 1, when
computed for our entire sample, the correlation coe¢ cient is -0.08. The correlation coe¢ cient
5rises to -0.11 when it is computed on the subsample of countries that default at least once
over the period. Independently of the sample of countries, these results imply a negative but
weak relationship. The low correlation between default and output is understandable in light
of the graphical examples above. Countries like Argentina and Chile have often maintained
debt service in the face of adverse shocks; they have also defaulted during relatively good
times, or remained in default long after output has recovered. However, it is also possible
that, because default is an qualitative variable taking on values of only one and zero while our
measure of business cycles is a quantitative variable, the correlation coe¢ cient understates
the relationship between default and output.
To address this issue, we computed two alternative measures: the average deviation
from trend and the proportion of years in which output was below trend. Table 2 shows that,
on average, defaults began when output was about 1.6 percentage points below trend, and
that economic performance remained about 1.4 points below trend during the entire default
episode. (We focus on estimates in which the smoothing parameter is 400, but results
are similar when other values for this parameter are used). In contrast, output typically
matched trend in the ￿rst year after a default, and was about two-tenths of a point above
trend during non-default years. Table One also shows that roughly sixty-two per-cent of the
169 default episodes began in ￿bad times.￿ Moreover, output was below trend a majority
of years during which the defaults persisted. In contrast, output was typically above trend
in periods of non-default, including the year immediately after a country settled its arrears.
Taken together, these estimates con￿rm that defaults are more common in bad times than
in good.
Nonetheless, the relationship is surprisingly weak. In more than 39 percent of all
observations (.473 ￿ 7657 / 9244), countries managed to avoid default even though output
was below trend, whereas in nearly 44 percent of all default-years, countries remained in
default even though output had surged above trend. Our estimates further imply that more
than one-third of defaults began during ￿good times,￿and that more than half of defaults
ended during bad times (see the column labeled ￿last year of default,￿which indicates the
year in which debtors settled their arrears with creditors.)
But perhaps defaults occur only when output drops severely? To explore this possibil-
6ity, we sorted the data according to the depth of the economic downturn. Table 3 shows that
defaults were about twice as likely during the most severe economic contractions (more than
7 percent below trend) than during other periods. This ￿nding lends support to a negative
but nonlinear relationship between output and default. Even so, the same data also show
that only one-third of debtors lapsed into default when falling on extremely hard times, and
that roughly one-￿fth defaulted while experiencing a boom period in which output exceeded
trend by more than 10 percentage points. The results are similar if we restrict attention to the
￿rst year of a default; although 4.3 per-cent of countries which experienced a recession more
than 7 per-cent below trend defaulted in that year, 2.3 per-cent of countries experiencing a
boom of more than 7 per-cent above trend also defaulted that same year.
Finally, Table 4, which has three panels containing results for each value of the Hodrick-
Prescott smoothing parameter, assesses the robustness of these results to changing the time
period under study, and varying the sample of countries to exclude developed countries.
Focusing on the results for a smoothing parameter of 400 in Table 4A, we ￿nd that defaults
were more likely to occur in good times during the 19th Century, although this ￿nding is
based on data from only eleven default episodes. In the interwar period, more than three
quarters of all defaults began when output was below trend, re￿ ecting the wave of defaults
that coincided with the Great Depression. For the modern period, results are very similar
to those for the entire sample, re￿ ecting the fact that three quarters of our data comes from
this period. Varying the sample of countries by income or population has little impact on
the results.
3. Lessons for Theory and Policy
The empirical results described above con￿rm our intuition that defaults tend to be
associated with adverse economic conditions. However, the relationship is quite weak: coun-
tries sometimes default when economic conditions are strong, and often do not default when
output is low even though they have substantial stocks of external debt. These ￿ndings are
also potentially troubling to the extent that many of our theoretical e⁄orts aimed at under-
standing sovereign defaults are designed to reproduce a strong negative correlation between
default and output. To examine this, we contrast our empirical ￿ndings with the predictions
7of a class of models of sovereign default based on the pioneering work of Eaton and Gersovitz
(1981). In this class of models, markets are incomplete consisting only of one period non-
state-contingent bonds. Default is costly in the sense of leading to a period of exclusion from
international ￿nancial markets; default may also have a direct adverse e⁄ect on the level of
economic activity in the country. Default consequently provides (costly) insurance against
negative shocks to economic activity. This insurance feature implies that default should occur
most often when economic conditions are weak.
We focus on the model of sovereign default used by Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), which
shares some elements with recent papers by Arellano (2005) and Yue (2006). Speci￿cally, con-











for some ￿ > 0: Each period, the country receives an exogenous endowment of the single
non-storable consumption good yt which evolves stochastically according to
lnyt = ln￿t + zt:
Here, ￿t represents a stochastic trend in output which evolves according to
ln￿t+1 = ln￿t + lngt+1;




















Alternatively, zt captures transitory movements in output and evolves according to







8Each period t begins with the country owning a (possibly negative) stock of foreign
bonds at which represent a claim to one unit of the consumption good. If the country decides
to default, they are excluded from international capital markets (this is not uncontroversial;
see, for example, Wright 2002 and the references cited therein). As long as the country is out
of international markets, they cannot smooth their consumption. Moreover, it is assumed
that they lose a fraction ￿ of their output endowment. Exclusion from ￿nancial markets ends
with probability ￿ each period, at which point output returns to normal and the country
can access international capital markets starting with zero debts. A country with access to
capital markets can smooth its consumption by trading in foreign bonds at price qt:
The model is closed by specifying that international capital markets are populated by
a large number of risk neutral investors facing an opportunity cost of their funds given by r￿:
Given a probability of default as a function of assets given by ￿ (at) (to be determined endoge-
nously), investors will lend to a country at the nonlinear price q (at) = (1 ￿ ￿ (at))=(1 + r￿).
Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) consider two versions of this framework. The ￿rst version
shares the approach of Arellano (2005) and others in focusing on movements in output that,
while persistent, are ultimately transitory movements about a deterministic trend so that
lngt is a constant. The main innovation of their paper is to additionally examine a version
of this model in which stochastic movements in the growth rate of the economy are the only
force driving output ￿ uctuations (so that zt = 0 for all t). We solve both versions of the
model numerically using the algorithm described in Arellano (2005). Parameter values are as
speci￿ed in Tables 3A and 3B of Aguiar and Gopinath, modi￿ed for an annual frequency of
observation as described in the appendix. We simulate the model for 4,000 years and extract
the last 2000 years to eliminate the e⁄ects of initial conditions. Results are presented for dif-
ferent values of the smoothing parameter, and are averaged over 100 simulations (simulations
in which no default occurred are discarded in computing moments conditional on default).
Table 5 presents results for both versions of the model for all the empirical moments
we have emphasized. As a result of the low annual discount factor, both versions of the model
support relatively little debt in equilibrium compared to what is observed in the data: as
discount rates are high, the threat of future punishments has less impact in deterring default,
and creditors lend little in equilibrium. In the modle with permanent shocks, countries default
9about twice a Century which is close to the frequency observed in the data. However, the
model with transitory shocks produce very little default: on the order of once every two
millenia. Further, the model has been calibrated to produce defaults lasting only two and
half years on average which, although closer to the data for last ten years, is much too short
to match the long-run historical data.
How should we expect the model to perform on the dimensions studied in the data
above? As the model has two state variables ￿debt and output (on in the case of permanent
shocks, output growth) ￿the model does not imply a one to one relationship between output
and defaults; the relationship also depends non-linearly on debt levels. Nonetheless, the
relationship predicted by both versions of the model for default and output is much tighter
than the relationship found in the data. As shown in Table 6, for the permanent shock model
the contemporaneous correlation between output and default is around ￿0:2 which is more
than twice the level found in the historical data. The transitory shock model produces a
much lower correlation in line with the data, but only as a result of it producing far fewer
defaults than the permanent shock model, or than found in the historical record. The much
stronger negative relationship emerges even more clearly in Table 7 which shows that, for
the model with transitory shocks, every default begins when output is below trend, while in
the permanent shock model between 85 per-cent and 100 per-cent of defaults begin in bad
times. As the model is parameterized to produce defaults lasting on average two and one-
half years, output has little time to recover during a default, leading the model to generate
the prediction that between 75 and 85 per-cent of all default years should be below trend.
Output is also dramatically below trend during defaults. In the transitory shock model,
defaults begin when output is a startling 41 per-cent below its trend level, while even in the
permanent shock version, output is more than seven per-cent below trend. During a default,
output stays between ￿fteen and twenty per-cent below trend in the stationary model, and
between three and six per-cent below trend with permanent shocks.
In summary, the baseline parameterization of both versions of the model produce a
relationship between default and output that is much tighter than that exhibited in the data:
output falls more in default than is observed, and almost all default years are associated with
output levels below trend. The role of default in the model as providing insurance against
10output declines hard wires a strong negative correlation between output and default in the
￿rst year of a default for all parameter values.
It is conceivable that the models predictions for the relationship between output and
default more generally may be improved by calibrating the model with a lower settlement
probability and with a lower output cost of default. Both Aguiar and Gopinath (2005) and
Yue (2005) postulate a direct output cost of default of two per-cent in their theoretical work
in response to estimates by Sturzenegger (2002) of the output costs of defaults. As we have
seen, when the direct output cost of default is combined with the tendency to only default
when output is below trend, the model often produces a level of output, conditional on being
in default, as much as twenty per-cent below trend. However, in our empirical work above,
we found that in default the output of a country is, on average, only 1.5 per-cent below trend,
while when it is in good standing it is on average two tenths of one per-cent above trend.
That is, in order to match the data, the direct output cost of default in the model cannot
be larger than (and probably needs to be much less than) 1.7 per-cent. Moreover, for other
values of the Hodrick-Prescott smoothing parameter, output is found to be no more than
(and in some cases much less than) one per-cent lower during a default. This leads us to
investigate the e⁄ect of reducing the direct output cost of a default one-hundred-fold. We
also calibrate the annual settlement probability such that defaults last on average 10.1 years,
which is the average length of a default in our historical data set.
Table 5 shows that the e⁄ect of these changes is to drastically reduce the amount
of debt that a country is allowed to accumulate; the threat of longer exclusion period from
￿nancial markets is dwarfed by the cost of losing a larger fraction of the countries output.
Table 5 also shows that countries default much less often; in the permanent shock model,
only once every 150 years. In the transitory shock model, no defaults were recorded in
our two-thousand year simulations. As shown in Table 9, and con￿ning attention to the
permanent shock model, countries now stay in default long enough for output to rise back
above trend; sixty ￿ve per-cent of default years are now below trend, which is almost exactly
the proportion found in the data. However, because defaults still tend to begin when output
is very far below trend, the average level of output in the year a default begins is 8 per-cent
for the permanent shock model compared to less than two per-cent in the data.
114. Conclusions
In this paper, we have provided the ￿rst long-run analysis of the relationship between
default and economic performance. Our analysis is based on a new data set on borrowing,
defaults and economic activity for a large number of countries since 1820. We estimate a
negative but surprisingly weak relationship between default and economic activity. Through-
out history, countries have indeed defaulted during bad times, but they have also maintained
debt service in the face of severe adverse shocks, and they have defaulted when domestic eco-
nomic conditions were highly favorable. This pattern is puzzling, not only because it seems
inconsistent with the conventional wisdom that countries default in response to adverse eco-
nomic conditions, but also because it stands at odds with prominent models in which default
provides costly insurance against economic adversity.
It is possible that a di⁄erent de￿nition of ￿bad times￿for an economy would produce
results more in line with the conventional wisdom. For example, although the Hodrick-
Prescott ￿lter is by far the most widely used technique for constructing business cycles, it
may be that a stronger negative relationship could be found by using a band pass ￿lter, or
by using a ￿lter based on growth rates of output, such as the Bry-Boschan ￿lter advocated
by Harding and Pagan (2002). Another possibility is that, as suggested by Levi-Yeyati and
Panizza (2006), the relationship between defaults and output is di⁄erent when measured at
quarterly as opposed to annual frequencies. However, our preliminary results suggest that
our ￿ndings are robust to using other ￿ltering methods, while an inspection of the examples
presented in Figure 1 of Levi-Yeyati and Panizza (2006) reveals that the measure of bad times
is the same regardless of whether quarterly or annual data is used.
It is important to remember, however, that regardless of whether or not alternative
methods can restore a strong negative relationship between default and output in the data,
our ￿ndings demonstrate an inconsistency between our theories and the data. Consequently,
we need to revise our models of sovereign debt. We o⁄er three conjectures for future work.
First, defaults may provide insurance, not against variation in aggregate output as implied
by current models, but instead against ￿ uctuations in some narrower component of economic
activity. For example, default may be the optimal response to severe declines in exports,
12government revenues, or the output of the tradeables sector. Likewise, default may help
countries cope with increases in the cost of capital, and would therefore be more likely to
occur when world interest rates rise.
A second direction for research would explore the interaction between domestic and
international forces. Perhaps defaults o⁄er the most relief when economic downturns can-
not be smoothed by additional borrowing. By this logic, one would expect a contingent
relationship between output and default: countries respond to domestic recessions by bor-
rowing when global capital markets are ￿ ush, and by defaulting when adverse conditions in
international markets make additional borrowing di¢ cult, if not impossible. New models,
built on these premises, could help explain the otherwise puzzling fact that declines in output
trigger default in some historical episodes but not in others. Models of this class could also
explain why, over the past two centuries, defaults have occurred in waves, with the largest
surges in the 1820s, 1870s, 1890s, 1930s, and 1980s (see, e.g., Suter 1992 and Tomz 2007).
These waves, we conjecture, occurred when recessions in borrowing countries coincided with
contractions in key creditor nations. Recent theoretical work has begun to explore these
possibilities. For example, Miller, Tomz and Wright (2006) develop a model in which de-
faults occur when international gains from trade are low either because economic conditions
are adverse or because world interest rates are high. The implications of these models should
be tested against the long-run historical record.
Finally, more energy should be devoted to developing mixed-motive models of default.
Many defaults over the past two centuries have coincided with dramatic collapses in economic
activity, and therefore seem consistent with default as a form of insurance. A notable
proportion of defaults occurred during good times, however, when economic circumstances at
home clearly would not warrant a lapse of payments. As Tomz (2007) notes, many of these
seemingly inexcusable defaults occurred when political upheavals brought new coalitions to
power that favored default for opportunistic or ideological reasons. A model of default that
includes not only on economic but also political shocks ￿that incorporates not only good
and bad times, but also good and bad governments ￿could account for signi￿cantly more of
the historical record than models that are currently available.
These conjectures, if valid, could have important policy implications. There has been
13much debate in recent years about how to reduce the frequency and costs of sovereign default
(see, for example, Pitchford and Wright 2006 and the references therein). Research on the
economic and political sources of default could help leaders prevent defaults, or at least
forecast them more accurately and address their root causes. Research could also specify
the likely consequences of making defaults less costly. To the extent that defaults arise
for opportunistic reasons, and not simply as a way to smooth consumption, policymakers
should exercise caution in reducing the costs of default. After all, such e⁄orts could have the
perverse e⁄ect of encouraging opportunistic lapses of payment. The results in this paper not
only advance our understanding of key theoretical issues in the literature, but they also lay a
foundation for empirically-informed improvements to the international ￿nancial architecture.
145. Data Appendix: Concepts, Sources and Methods
This appendix outlines the way we de￿ne defaults, as well as the methods used and
main data sources consulted in constructing our database
A. Economic Activity
The output series was constructed from 36 sources, which are listed below. When
combining data from di⁄erent sources, we used the following algorithm.
1. We dropped parts of any output series in which the economic growth rate remained
nearly constant for at least four successive years, because these records were almost
certainly based on interpolation between ￿xed points, rather than genuine measures
of economic performance from one year to the next. Our precise rule was as follows.
Let s index sources of information, c index countries, and t index time periods. De￿ne
gs;c;t = 100(GDPs;c;t￿GDPs;c;t￿1)=GDPs;c;t￿1, where t indexes years. If
P3
n=0(jgs;c;t￿n￿
gs;c;t￿n￿1j < :2) = 4, implying four successive periods in which growth in one period
was within two-tenths of one percentage point of growth in the previous period, then
delete observations GDPs;c;t￿1 to GDPs;c;t￿4.
2. We established a hierarchy of sources, which dictated which sources took precedence
when more than one source had information for a given country in a given year. Table
Eleven presents the hierarchy and indicates how many datapoints were ultimately drawn
from each source.
The country-speci￿c sources were as follows: Argentina: CortØs Conde (1997). Austria:
Schulze (2000). Austria-Hungary: Schulze (2000). Brazil: Goldsmith (1986). Chile:
Braun (2000). Colombia: GRECO (2002). Ecuador: Banco Central del Ecuador
(1997). Egypt: Hansen and Marzouk (1965); Yousef (2002). Germany: Ho⁄mann
(1965); Maddison (1995). Greece: Kostelenos (forthcoming). Hungary: Eckstein
(1995); Schulze (2000). Iceland: Gunnarsson (1990); Statistics Iceland (2005). Korea:
Mizoguchi (1988). Mexico: INEGI (1985). New Zealand: Greasley (2000); Rankin
(1992). Norway: Grytten (2004). Pakistan: Federal Bureau of Statistics - Pakistan
(1997). Portugal: CØsar das Neves (1994); Lains (2003). Rhodesia: Commission of
15Enquiry (1945). Russia: Gregory (1982). Taiwan: Mizoguchi (1988). United States:
Carter (2006).
3. For each country, we constructed a consistent time series by working backward in time
from the year 2004 to the year 1820. Each element c;t in the time series was ￿lled by
one of the following four algorithms, in priority order.
(a) Extrapolation without gaps. If GDPc;t+1 has already been ￿lled, let s be the
highest-ranking source that gives both GDPs;c;t and GDPs;c;t+1. Assign GDPc;t =
(GDPc;t+1)(GDPs;c;t)=(GDPs;c;t+1). ELSE
(b) Extrapolation with gaps using the last-used source. Find the minimum n such
that GDPc;t+n has already been ￿lled. Let s be the source that was used to
￿ll that cell. If source s gives both GDPs;c;t and GDPs;c;t+n, assign GDPc;t =
(GDPc;t+n)(GDPs;c;t)=(GDPs;c;t+n). ELSE
(c) Extrapolation with gaps using a di⁄erent source. Find the highest-ranking source
s that gives both GDPs;c;t and GDPs;c;t+n, where GDPc;t+n was ￿lled by a source
other than s. Find the minimum n that satis￿es this condition, and assign
GDPc;t = (GDPc;t+n)(GDPs;c;t)=(GDPs;c;t+n). ELSE
(d) Initiate a new series. Find the highest-ranking source s that gives GDPs;c;t,
and assign GDPc;t = GDPs;c;t. This creates a series break, since the unit of
measurement in GDPc;t will not necessarily match the units in GDPc;t+n, where
n ￿ 1.
4. Finally, our measure of good times was constructed by applying the Hodrick-Prescott
￿lter. Attention was restricted to series in which in which data are expressed in
comparable units for at least 10 consecutive years. Note that, due to series breaks,
some countries will have more than one time series, e.g. one series before World War I
and a second series after World War I. HP calculations were done in Stata 9.2 using
the hprescott procedure, which was written by Kit Baum.
16B. Debtors
Only borrowers can default, and so we restricted our analysis to years for which a
country was a debtor in gross terms. To do this, we constructed an indicator variable that
took on the value of one if a country had debts outstanding in a given year, and zero otherwise.
Measures of borrowing were derived from a number of sources. For the period 1970 to the
present, data on developing countries was taken from the debtor reporting system of the
World Bank as summarized in their Global Development Finance publication. We focused
entirely on public and publicly guaranteed debt in the form of either bank loans of bonds
(that is, trade credit was excluded). For South Korea, which no longer participates in the
debtor reporting system, historical issues of Global Development Finance were used.
There were some additional issues that had to be confronted concerning the period
from 1970-2004 and data from Global Development Finance. These include:
1. In some cases, Standard and Poors lists a country as being in default on bank loans
in the period 1970-2004 despite the fact that Global Development Finance does not
list the country as having any outstanding long-term public or publicly guaranteed
loans due to commercial banks. However, Global Development Finance often includes
entries for either principal or interest arrears from private creditors for this period (this
￿gure is not divided into bonds, bank loans, or other debts). In these cases, we assume
that some of the arrears were on debts to commercial banks and list borrower dates as
the dates of amounts in arrears. This a⁄ected the following countries: Albania (1991-
2004), Burkina Faso (1992-2002), Cape Verde (1986-1997, 1999-2004), Central African
Republic (1970-2004), Ethiopia (1991-92), Guinea (1970-77, 1998-2004), Guinea-Bissau
(1984-2000), Iran (1992), Mauritania (1985-95, 1999). Mozambique (2000-2004), Niger
(1975, 1991-1993), Sao Tome and Principe (1986-1994), Sierra Leone (1973, 1995-2000,
2003-4), Togo (1970-72),
2. Croatia and Macedonia are listed as being in default in 1992, and having arrears in
1993, the ￿rst year that they appear in Global Development Finance. We code them as
having debts in 1992.
3. In some cases, a country is listed by Standard and Poors as being in default on bank
17loans at a time before the country reported debts to Global Development Finance. In
these cases, we code the country as having amounts outstanding for the exact years
that they are listed in default. This may omit some years in which the country was a
borrower prior to the default. This a⁄ected the following countries and years: Angola
(1985-1988), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1997),
4. In some cases, a country is listed by Standard and Poors as being in default on bank
loans at a time before the country reported positive debts to Global Development Fi-
nance. In these cases, we code the country as having amounts outstanding for the exact
years that they are listed in default. This may omit some years in which the country
was a borrower prior to the default. This a⁄ected the following countries: Cape Verde
(1981-1986), Iran (1978-79), Mozambique (1980, 1983), Vietnam (1985-1988). In the
case of Iran, this problem was also addressed using data from the Adler Sovereign Bond
Database as described below.
5. In some cases, a country is listed by Standard and Poors as being in default on bank
loans but is not a member of the debtor reporting system. In the absence of other
measures of bank debt outstanding, we code the country as having amounts outstanding
for the exact years that they are listed in default. This may omit some years in which
the country was a borrower both prior to and after the default. This a⁄ected the
following countries and years: Antigua and Barbuda (1996-2004), Cuba (1997-2004),
East Germany (1971, 1978, 1982), Iraq (1987-2004), North Korea (1974-2004), Nauru
(2002-2004), Slovenia (1992-1996), North Yemen (1985-1989)
6. In some cases, a country is listed in default for a year immediately after the last years
that they are listed as having outstanding debts. It is possible that this discrepancy is
due to time aggregation. Global Development Finance records debts in September of
the relevant year, while we record defaults as occurring in the year if the country was
in default for any month of the year (other than for settlements agreed to in January).
In this case, we code the country as being a borrower for that year. This a⁄ected:
Mauritania (1996), Togo (1997).
For developed countries for 1914 to 2004, and for developing countries for the period
1914 to 1970, the primary source of data on amounts outstanding was the Adler Sovereign
18Bond Database. In some cases, the amount outstanding data for a bond was missing. This
was resolved in a number of ways:
1. When amount outstanding data were reported for the same bond for non-consecutive
years, the amounts were interpolated.
2. When amount outstanding data were not available beyond certain years, but price data
were available for these bonds, a positive value for amount outstanding was recorded.
3. When amount outstanding data were not available beyond certain years, and price data
were not available for these bonds, a positive value for amount outstanding was recorded
if the bond terms implied that the bond had not matured and there was no record of a
default or early redemption of debt.
In a small number of cases, questions remained after this process was complete. In
some cases, these questions could be resolved by resort to alternative sources. In some cases,
these questions remain unresolved. A list of these questionable cases includes:
1. Paraguay is recorded as having debts from the beginning of the debtor reporting system
in 1970. The Adler database records bond debts up to and including 1966. The 1970
and 1971 Annual Reports of the World Bank records positive values for Paraguay￿ s
foreign debts from private creditors (not including trade credits) in 1968 and 1969. As
a consequence, we implied a positive debt level for Paraguay for 1867.
2. Haiti, Barbados and Grenada are recorded as having positive levels of bond debt in
1970 according to the debtor reporting system. All are recorded as having zero bond
debt in the Adler database of sovereign bonds for 1969. For these cases, zero values for
debt were left unchanged prior to 1970.
3. Egypt is recorded as having positive commercial bank debt in 1970 according to the
debtor reporting system, but no bond debt in 1970. According to the Adler database,
it has no bond debt from 1963 to 1969. According to the World Bank publication Bor-
rowing in International Capital Markets, Egypt did not enter into any new commercial
bank loans in 1970. In this case, based on the assumption that commercial bank debt
existed prior to 1970, positive values for debt have been interpolated.
194. According to the debtor reporting service, Romania had no outstanding sovereign debt
from private creditors for 1972-78 and 1989-91. However, the Adler database records
Romania has having outstanding debts for all of these years. Although the debtor
reporting service is generally considered to be the de￿nitive source, because it relies on
self-reporting by the debtor country, it may neglect debts which are in dispute between
creditors and debtors. We elected to follow the Adler database in this case.
5. The debtor reporting system records Iran as having no outstanding sovereign debts
from private creditors from 1971 to 1979. The procedure described above for using the
Adler database would impute positive values for these years as there are price data in
1981 for some older bonds which were supposed to have matured prior to this date.
Standard and Poors record Iran as being in default on bank loans in 1978 and 1979. It
is possible that bonds in default continued to be traded, but it seems more likely that
this is a data error. Hence, we impute positive debt levels for Iran for only the years
1978 and 1979.
For the period prior to 1914, we used the series described in Tomz (2007).
There were some inconsistencies between the data for the period before 1914, and that
from 1914 onwards. In some cases, the di⁄erence was due to the fact that the Adler database
focused upon bonds issued in the 20th Century, and consequently ignored some bonds that
were issued at the end of the 19th Century and that were still outstanding in the early 20th
century. In these cases, we examined Moody￿ s manuals for the period to cover any overlapping
years. This was done for Saar, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, St
Kitts and Nevis, Guadelope, Martinique, Guyana, Bolivia, Luxembourg, Germany, French
West Africa, Nigeria, South Africa, Madagascar, Mauritius, Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia.
In other cases, the di⁄erence was due to the fact that the Adler database excludes bonds
issued in the home currency, or issued at home, even if those bonds were traded overseas and
were actively held by foreigners. In such cases, which includes a number of well known net
creditors (but gross debtors) such as the United Kingdom, France, and the United States, we
included them as debtors.
A few remaining special cases included:
201. The Adler database excludes some bond issues by Newfoundland on the grounds, ap-
parently, that Newfoundland was a province of Canada, despite the fact that it was
autonomous until the 1940￿ s.
2. The Adler database sometimes mislabels bonds from the Belgian Congo (or Congo -
Kinshasa) as bonds from the French Congo (or Congo - Brazzaville). This misclassi￿-
cation was resolved by reference to Moody￿ s manuals.
3. Data on bondholdings by Cape Colony, Natal and Transvaal are excluded after 1910
on the basis of their becoming provinces of South Africa.
4. The Adler database misclassi￿es some debts of British Honduras (Belize) as debts of
Honduras. This was resolved by reference to Moody￿ s manuals.
5. The Adler database does not list any bonds for Austria-Hungary. However, in the note
sections of the database, some bonds are listed as being Austro-Hungarian bonds that
were later divided amongst Austria and Hungary. We use these bonds to infer that the
Hapsburgs owed debts until 1918.
C. Defaults
We de￿ne a country to be in default in a given year if it was in default for any part of
that year. A default is de￿ned to have begun at the time that any interest or amortization
payment was missed, or at the time any change in payment terms was announced, whichever
comes ￿rst. A default is de￿ned to end at the time in which creditors agree to a settlement
with the debtor. If a settlement is agreed in January of the relevant year, then the country is
recorded as not being in default for that year. In a small number of cases, a country settles
old debts and then defaults again in the same year. Our work treates these incidents as part
of the original default event.
The primary source for information on defaults in the latter part of the 20th Century
is the collection of default dates by Standard and Poors (Beers 2003, 2004). This source gives
dates for defaults on both foreign currency bond debt, and on commercial bank loans. There
have been substantial changes in the default dates for some countries between the 2003 and
2004 editions of this publication. In all cases we have followed the 2004 edition.
21Prior to 1985, Standard and Poors rely on the work of Suter (1990, 1992) in construct-
ing default dates. We follow Suter (1990) only for the post war period. Instead, for the 19th
Century, and for early part of the 20th Century, our primary source is Duggan and Tomz
(2006), while for the interwar period we rely on a range of di⁄erent sources. In many cases,
the list of default dates that we derive is identical to that provided by Suter (1992). However,
there are a number of instances in which we ￿nd defaults to have begun or ended in di⁄erent
years, while there are also a number of cases in which we ￿nd that defaults listed by Suter
did not occur altogether. Some of these discrepancies may be due to di⁄erent conventions in
coding (for example, using an indicator for default status on a particular date for each year,
or coding the end of a default at the date the government proposed ￿nal terms), while others
appear to be the result of di⁄erent interpretations of the available evidence. There are also
a small number of unresolved questions regarding the dating of some of the defaults.
A list of these cases, as well as a description of some special cases that were not easily
classi￿ed, follows, along with a brief description of our reasoning. More information on these
defaults can be found in Duggan and Tomz (2006).
1. Austria 1868-1871
We found that this default ended in 1871, as opposed to 1870, because newspaper
reports in The Times of London 12th December 1871 refer to the fact that a settle-
ment had not yet been reached, while reports on 28th December make reference to a
settlement which had ￿just been e⁄ected.￿
2. Bolivia 1875-1880
We found that this default ended one year later when the Corporation of Foreign Bond-
holders reported that long-standing litigation returned funds to bondholders
We do not record the delayed interest payment of 1874 (the ￿lock box￿episode) as a
default.
3. Brazil 1826-29
We found that Brazil was not in default on foreign borrowing from 1826 to 1829. This
is a complicated episode where various sources disagree as to whether or not there was
an actual default and, if there was a default, whether or not it extended to foreign
debts. Even Suter (1990) di⁄ers from Suter (1992), where the former only lists 1826-27
22as a default. Ultimately, we excluded this episode based on a number of contemporary
sources, cited in Duggan and Tomz (2006) which indicate that Brazil did not default on
foreign loans from 1826-7, and on the fact that any default in 1828-9 involved at most
one obligation of the Portuguese government, which were assumed by Brazil as part
of diplomatic negotiations with European powers, and where repayments were deferred
only due to the secession crisis in Portugal.
4. Bulgaria 1932-1985
We follow Suter (1990) in ending this default in 1985. However, no documentation is
provided to justify the choice of this date.
5. Chile 1880-1884
We found that this default ended in 1884, as opposed to 1883, because the missed
sinking fund drawings were made up beginning with the drawing in January 1885.
6. China 1939-1949
We follow Suter (1990), although other sources use a later date.
7. Colombia 1848-61, 1877, 1879-1896, 1900-1905
We found that the default of 1848-61 began two years earlier because the ￿rst interest
payment was missed on 1st June 1848.
We added the default of 1877 when payments were suspended because of an insurrection.
The arrears were liquidated in January of 1878.
We found that the default of 1879-1896 started in 1879 because the July 1879 coupon,
which was payable in October, was the ￿rst payment missed.
We found that the default of 1900-1905 ended in 1905 because in April of that year
agreement was reached with the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders. Suter (1990) also
lists an end date of 1905.
8. Costa Rica 1828-1844
We found that this default ended in 1844 because bondholders only voted to accept the
o⁄er of 1840 in April of 1844.
9. Cuba 1960
Other sources date the end of this default much later. We follow Suter (1990).
10. Czechoslovakia 1959-1960
23We follow Suter (1990), although other sources date the end of this default much later.
11. Dominican Republic 1899-1908
We found that the default of 1899-1908 ended one year later because it was not until
1908 that French and Belgian bondholders voted to accept the settlement arising from
the treaty of 1907.
12. Ecuador 1868-1891, and 1894-1899
We found that the default of 1868-91 ended one year later because the bondholder
meeting of 1890 added stipulations to the governments o⁄er. It was not until 1891 that
bondholders accepted the original o⁄er.
We found that the default of 1894-99 ended one year later because the last agreement
was negotiated with bondholders in March 1899 after three years of previous negotia-
tions.
13. El Salvador 1897-1899
We found that this default began one year earlier and ended one year later than Suter￿ s
estimates of 1898. The 1897 start date refers to the missed amortization payments in
November of that year, while the 1899 end date refers to the negotiated settlement of
February that year.
14. Greece 1894-1898
We found that this default ended in 1898 because the ￿nal convention was signed in
March of 1898.
15. Guatemala 1894-1895, and 1898-1913
We found that the 1894-1895 default ended on year later because bondholders voted to
accept the agreement in may of 1895.
We found that the 1898-1913 default started one year earlier as bondholders agreed to
reschedule debts in November of 1898. This was then followed by an outright default
on the rescheduled debts in 1899.
16. Honduras 1871-1925
We found that this default started two years earlier because of missed amortization
payments in 1871. The ￿rst coupon payments were missed in 1873.
17. Liberia 1874-1899
24We found that the default of 1874-1899 started and ended one year earlier because the
August 1874 coupons were not paid, while bondholders agreed to accept terms in March
of 1899.
18. Ottoman Empire 1875-1881
We do not include the short delays in interest payments in 1866, 1871 and 1874 as
defaults.
We found that the 1875-1881 default began one year earlier because an amortization
payment was missed in May of 1875.
19. Paraguay 1892-96
We found that the default of 1892-96 ended one year later as bondholders rati￿ed the
settlement in April 1896.
20. Peru 1876-1890
We found that this default ended in 1890 when bondholders met and accepted the
agreement.
21. Russia 1918
We follow Suter (1990) and Beers (2003, 2004) who record the Russian repudiation as
starting and ending in 1918. Other sources date the end of this default much later.
22. Spain 1823-1834, 1836-1867, and 1872-1882
We found that the default of 1823-1834 began one year earlier because the loans were
repudiated in October and the ￿rst coupon payment was missed in November 1823.
We found that the default of 1836-1867 began one year earlier because coupon payments
were missed in November of 1836.
We corrected a typographical error that appears in both Suter (1992) and Beers (2003,
2004) concerning the start of the 1872 default episode.
23. Tunisia 1878-1884
We add this default episode. Coupon payments were missed, or not paid in full, in
1878, 1879, 1880 and 1881. The default ends in 1884 when France assumes these debts.
24. Uruguay 1875-1878
We found that this default started one year earlier when a November amortization
payment was missed.
2525. Venezuela 1847-59, 1864-1880, and 1892-1893
We found that the default of 1847-59 started one year earlier when the October 1847
coupon payment was missed.
We found that the default of 1864-1880 started one year earlier and ended one year
later. The default was announced in December 1874. Although proposed in January
of 1880, the settlement was not accepted by bondholders until February. We do not
consider the partial settlement of 1876 to constitute an end of the default.
We found that the default of 1892-1893 ended one year later because payments were
resumed in June 1893 (this is in line with Suter 1990, but not Suter 1992).
D. Other Variables
1. ￿Rich￿and ￿poor￿countries in 2000, 1950, 1915, 1870 and 1820
These indicator variables were constructed using data on GDP per capita at PPP￿ s
taken from Maddison (2002). In order to control, as much as possible, for selection
bias, we divided the sample according to whether countries were ￿rich￿in 2000, 1950,
1915, 1870 and 1820. In all years but 1950, we de￿ned a country to be ￿rich￿if its
income per capita was at least half as large as the income per capita of the richest
country. For 1820, the richest country in Maddison￿ s data set was the Netherlands; in
1870 it was Australia; in 1915 and 2000 it was the USA. In 1950, the richest countries in
the world were Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, with Maddison estimating
Qatar to have a level of income per capita roughly three times as large as in the United
States. Hence for 1950, we de￿ne a country as being rich if its income per capita was
no less than half the level of the United States.
We de￿ned a country to be ￿poor￿in two alternative ways. First, we de￿ne a country
to be poor if it is not ￿rich.￿This assumes that if Maddison does not have an estimate
of a country￿ s income per capita in a given year, it is poor. This is probably reasonable
given that richer countries tend to have more comprehensive historical data. Second,
and alternatively, we de￿ne a country to be poor if Maddison has data for that country
in the relevant year, and it is not rich by our criterion. We refer to these alternative
26measures as Poor (1) and Poor (2) in the tables, respectively.
2. Interest Rates
The main creditor countries for the period under study were the United Kingdom,
and the United States of America. We constructed measures of the tightness of credit
markets in these countries using interest rate series constructed by Global Financial
Data. For the United Kingdom we used the yield on a 2.5% consol (￿le IGGBRCY),
while for the United States we used the yield on 10 year government bond which have
been calculated to ensuring a constant maturity (￿le IGUSA10Y). Both of these series
were available for the entire period under study, and in both cases we use yields on 31st
December of the relevant year.
3. In￿ ation Rates
Ex post real interest rates were constructed by subtracting the rate of in￿ ation from the
nominal interest rate series discussed above. For the United Kingdom we use a retail
price index series (￿le CPGBRY) while for the United States we use a consumer price
index (￿le CPUSAY)
4. Money Supplies
Data on the nominal stock of money, de￿ned as M2, was obtained from Warren Weber.
276. Numerical Appendix
To match the predictions of the theories of sovereign default proposed by Eaton and
Gersovitz, Arrelano and Aguiar and Gopinath, we need to adapt their calibrations to annual
frequency. There is some controversy about how this should be done. We describe our
procedure below. The resulting parameter values are collected in Table 10.
A. Redemption Probability
If ￿
Q is the probability of a default ending in a quarter, then the probability of the































B. Discount and Interest Rates
If the representative agent for a country discounts consumption next quarter at a rate
given by ￿

















Given a stochastic process of the form
yt+1 = ￿yt + "t+1;
where t indexes quarters, we can ￿nd
yt+4 = ￿
4yt + ^ "t+4;
28where
^ "t+4 = ￿
3"t+1 + ￿
2"t+2 + ￿"t+3 + "t+4:
Hence, if annual output is constructed by cumulating four quarters of output ￿ ows, we have
y
A
s+1 = yt+4 + yt+3 + yt+2 + yt+1
= ￿
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where s indexes years, and where
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Note that this imparts a moving average component to the innovations in this equation.
For simplicity, we will abstract from this moving average component, and adjust only the
autocorrelation parameter and the variance of the innovations
￿^ "a = ￿"
h
1 + (1 + ￿)
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29Table One: Historical Correlations between Default and Leads/Lags of Output Shocks
Whole Sample Defaulting Countries
Output Lead/Lag HP 400 HP 100 HP 6.25 HP 400 HP 100 HP 6.25
-4 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
-3 -0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.02
-2 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 -0.05 -0.02 0.01
-1 -0.07 -0.05 -0.03 -0.09 -0.07 -0.04
0 -0.08 -0.06 -0.03 -0.11 -0.08 -0.04
+1 -0.07 -0.05 -0.01 -0.10 -0.06 -0.01
+2 -0.07 -0.04 0.00 -0.09 -0.05 0.00
+3 -0.06 -0.03 0.01 -0.08 -0.03 0.01
+4 -0.05 -0.02 0.00 -0.07 -0.03 0.00















Country-Years (N) 9,244 1,597 7,657 169 160 150
HP smoothing parameter = 400
Country-Years Below Trend (%) 48.8 56.2 47.3 61.5 58.8 47.3
Mean Deviation from Trend (%) -0.1 -1.4 0.2 -1.6 -1.3 0.0
HP smoothing parameter = 100
Country-Years Below Trend (%) 48.9 54.7 47.7 64.5 53.8 42.7
Mean Deviation from Trend (%) -0.1 -0.9 0.1 -1.7 -0.7 0.3
HP smoothing parameter = 6.25
Country-Years Below Trend (%) 48.8 50.7 48.4 63.3 48.8 39.3
Mean Deviation from Trend (%) 0.0 -0.3 0.0 -1.5 -0.1 0.5
31Table Three: Historical Default Rates, by Output Quantiles
HP 400 HP 100 HP 6.25
Size of Shock Cuto⁄ Default Default Cuto⁄ Default Default Cuto⁄ Default Default
Rate Initiation Rate Initiation Rate Initiation
(%) (%) Rate (%) (%) (%) Rate (%) (%) (%) Rate (%)
worst 5% -11.0 32.0 4.3 -9.0 31.5 4.8 -5.5 29.9 5.2
5-10% -7.0 29.3 4.3 -5.7 25.3 3.7 -3.5 20.7 3.9
10-25% -2.8 19.6 2.5 -2.3 18.7 3.0 -1.4 17.7 2.4
25-50% 0.1 15.3 1.3 0.1 15.7 1.3 0.1 14.8 1.4
50-75% 3.0 12.7 1.0 2.5 12.7 0.7 1.5 15.1 1.3
75-90% 6.9 16.2 1.4 5.5 17.0 1.5 3.6 16.6 1.2
90-95% 10.1 15.9 2.4 8.2 16.9 1.9 5.2 20.3 1.5
95-100% 20.6 2.2 22.5 2.4 21.6 1.5
32Table Four A: Robustness Checks (HP 400)
















1820-1869 525 2 91 42.9 0.5 0.0 3.8
1870-1913 1,232 9 77 46.8 0.2 44.4 -0.1
1920-1938 932 26 163 59.5 -2.4 76.9 -8.3
1950-2004 5,870 125 1,103 58.2 -1.4 61.6 -0.9
1970-2004 4,284 121 987 59.6 -1.6 61.2 -0.8
1980-2004 3,208 110 930 60.4 -1.7 62.7 -0.9
1990-2004 1,964 40 539 61.8 -2.4 67.5 -1.6
Poor (1) in 2000 6,638 163 1,534 56.9 -1.4 63.2 -2.0
Poor (1) in 1950 7,338 163 1,561 56.1 -1.4 61.4 -1.6
Poor (1) in 1913 7,066 151 1,489 55.8 -1.3 60.3 -1.2
Poor (1) in 1870 7,379 158 1,556 55.9 -1.3 60.1 -1.3
Poor (1) in 1820 7,346 162 1,515 57.1 -1.5 63.0 -1.9
Poor (2) in 2000 5,782 156 1,443 56.8 -1.4 62.2 -1.9
Poor (2) in 1950 6,261 148 1,434 55.4 -1.4 61.5 -1.7
Poor (2) in 1913 3,486 63 646 51.6 -1.2 55.6 -0.4
Poor (2) in 1870 3,417 59 609 52.2 -1.3 54.2 -0.2
Poor (2) in 1820 2,630 36 362 53.6 -1.5 50.0 0.3
Population > 1m 8,685 162 1,536 56.0 -1.5 61.1 -1.7
33Table Four B: Robustness Checks (HP 100)
















1820-1869 525 2 91 42.9 0.4 0.0 4.7
1870-1913 1,232 9 77 49.4 0.1 44.4 -0.3
1920-1938 932 26 163 57.1 -2.2 76.9 -8.1
1950-2004 5,870 125 1,103 56.6 -0.8 65.6 -1.0
1970-2004 4,284 121 987 57.7 -0.9 65.3 -0.9
1980-2004 3,208 110 930 58.0 -1.0 65.5 -0.9
1990-2004 1,964 40 539 57.3 -1.4 67.5 -0.8
Poor (1) in 2000 6,638 163 1,534 55.3 -0.9 66.3 -2.1
Poor (1) in 1950 7,338 163 1,561 54.6 -0.9 64.4 -1.7
Poor (1) in 1913 7,066 151 1,489 54.6 -0.8 64.2 -1.3
Poor (1) in 1870 7,379 158 1,556 54.5 -0.8 63.9 -1.4
Poor (1) in 1820 7,346 162 1,515 55.3 -0.9 66.1 -2.0
Poor (2) in 2000 5,782 156 1,443 55.1 -0.9 65.4 -2.0
Poor (2) in 1950 6,261 148 1,434 53.8 -0.8 64.2 -1.8
Poor (2) in 1913 3,486 63 646 51.7 -0.7 57.1 -0.8
Poor (2) in 1870 3,417 59 609 51.9 -0.8 55.9 -0.5
Poor (2) in 1820 2,630 36 362 51.7 -0.8 52.8 0.1
Population > 1m 8,685 162 1,536 54.8 -0.9 64.2 -1.8
34Table Four C: Robustness Checks (HP 6.25)
















1820-1869 525 2 91 46.2 0.3 0.0 6.4
1870-1913 1,232 9 77 49.4 -0.0 44.4 -0.2
1920-1938 932 26 163 50.9 -1.0 76.9 -5.3
1950-2004 5,870 125 1,103 51.8 -0.3 63.2 -1.0
1970-2004 4,284 121 987 51.9 -0.3 63.6 -1.0
1980-2004 3,208 110 930 52.0 -0.3 63.6 -0.8
1990-2004 1,964 40 539 51.4 -0.4 67.5 -0.4
Poor (1) in 2000 6,638 163 1,534 51.0 -0.3 63.8 -1.6
Poor (1) in 1950 7,338 163 1,561 50.5 -0.3 62.6 -1.5
Poor (1) in 1913 7,066 151 1,489 50.8 -0.3 61.6 -1.2
Poor (1) in 1870 7,379 158 1,556 50.5 -0.3 61.4 -1.3
Poor (1) in 1820 7,346 162 1,515 51.0 -0.3 63.6 -1.7
Poor (2) in 2000 5,782 156 1,443 50.9 -0.3 62.8 -1.6
Poor (2) in 1950 6,261 148 1,434 50.1 -0.3 62.8 -1.7
Poor (2) in 1913 3,486 63 646 49.4 -0.2 54.0 -0.8
Poor (2) in 1870 3,417 59 609 49.8 -0.3 52.5 -0.6
Poor (2) in 1820 2,630 36 362 50.0 -0.2 47.2 -0.2
Population > 1m 8,685 162 1,536 50.9 -0.3 63.0 -1.5
35Table Five: Simulation Results for Debt and Default







Debt/GDP (Ave %) 10.1 0.2 6.5 0.1
Debt/GDP (Max %) 18.7 0.4 8.3 0.1
Defaults (# in 2000 years) 1.3 0.0 42.4 14.8
Years of Default (# in 2000 years) 3.6 0.0 121.3 149.9
Years of Default (% of years) 0.2 0.0 6.1 7.5
36Table Six: Correlation Between Default and Output in Simulation
Transitory Shocks Permanent Shocks
Output Lead/Lag HP 400 HP 100 HP 6.25 HP 400 HP 100 HP 6.25
-4 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.11 0.10 0.04
-3 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.10 0.10 0.07
-2 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.08
-1 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 0.02
0 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.19 -0.20 -0.18
+1 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.16 -0.14 -0.08
+2 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.12 -0.10 -0.02
+3 -0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.09 -0.06 0.01
+4 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.06 -0.03 0.02
37Table Seven: The Relationship Between Default and Output in Simulation
Transitory Shocks Permanent Shocks
HP=400 HP=100 HP=6.25 HP=400 HP=100 HP=6.25
Output in Default (Ave % dev) -25.7 -23.9 -17.8 -5.6 -4.6 -3.1
Output Not in Default (Ave % dev) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.2
Output in Default Start Year (Ave % dev) -41.6 -39.7 -33.4 -7.4 -7.2 -6.3
Output in Settlement Year (Ave % dev) -13.6 -11.6 -5.7 -4.5 -3.4 -1.3
Default Yrs Below Trend (%) 83.8 84.0 79.5 78.1 78.4 74.3
Non Default Yrs Below Trend (%) 50.0 50.0 50.0 48.3 48.2 48.5
Default Starts Below Trend (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 85.9 90.1 96.6
Settlements Above Trend (%) 24.5 22.4 26.4 27.1 29.7 38.2
38Table Eight: Default and the Size of Output Declines in Simulation
HP=400 HP=100 HP=6.25
Cuto⁄ Default Default Cuto⁄ Default Default Cuto⁄ Default Default
Rate Initiation Rate Initiation Rate Initiation
(%) (%) Rate (%) (%) (%) Rate (%) (%) (%) Rate (%)
Transitory Shocks
worst 5 -32.2 1.8 0.1 -29.3 1.7 1.3 -22.4 1.7 1.4
5-10 -25.3 0.4 0.0 -23.0 0.4 0.2 -17.4 0.2 0.1
10-25 -13.4 0.3 0.0 -12.1 0.3 0.0 -9.2 0.2 0.0
25-50 -0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0
50-75 13.3 0.1 0.0 12.1 0.1 0.0 9.2 0.1 0.0
Default 75-90 25.2 0.1 0.0 23.0 0.1 0.0 17.5 0.1 0.0
Years 90-95 32.3 0.1 0.0 29.4 0.0 0.0 22.3 0.1 0.0
by % 95-100 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0
of Permanent Shocks
Output worst 5 -12.3 20.9 9.5 -10.3 22.5 11.7 -7.0 25.1 17.3
Deviation 5-10 -9.6 14.1 6.0 -8.1 14.3 6.6 -5.5 14.2 8.0
10-25 -5.1 10.0 4.0 -4.2 9.8 4.0 -2.9 8.9 3.5
25-50 0.0 6.1 1.8 0.0 6.0 1.7 0.0 5.2 1.0
50-75 5.1 3.8 0.9 4.2 3.6 0.6 2.9 3.6 0.3
75-90 9.6 2.3 0.4 8.0 2.4 0.2 5.5 3.2 0.1
90-95 12.3 2.0 0.3 10.3 1.9 0.2 7.0 3.0 0.0
95-100 1.4 0.1 1.6 0.0 2.7 0.0
39Table Nine: Default and Output when Defaults are Long
Transitory Shocks Permanent Shocks
HP 400
Output in Default (Ave % dev) n.a. -2.8
Output Not in Default (Ave % dev) 0.0 0.2
Output in Default Start Year (Ave % dev) n.a. -8.4
Output in Settlement Year (Ave % dev) n.a. -2.0
Default Yrs Below Trend (%) n.a. 63.6
Non Default Yrs Below Trend (%) 50.0 48.9
Default Starts Below Trend (%) n.a. 88.8
Settlements Above Trend (%) n.a. 40.7
40Table Ten: Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) Baseline Parameter Values for Simulations
Temporary Shocks Permanent Shocks
parameter Quarterly Annual Quarterly Annual
Risk Aversion ￿ 2 2 2 2
Discount Factor ￿ 0.8 0.41 0.8 0.41
World Interest Rate r￿ 1% 4.1% 1% 4.1%
Loss of Output in Autarky ￿ 2% 2% 2% 2%
Probability of Settlement ￿ 10% 34% 10% 34%
Mean Growth Rate ￿g 1.006 1.024 1.006 1.024
Autocorrelation of Trend Growth ￿g n.a. n.a. 0.17 0.0008
Standard Deviation of Trend Growth ￿g n.a. n.a. 3% 0.07
Autocorrelation of Transitory Output ￿z 0.9 0.6561 n.a. n.a.
Standard Deviation of Transitory Output ￿z 0.034 0.1942 n.a. n.a.
41Table Eleven: Prioritized Sources of Output Data
Rank Source N
1 World Bank (2006) 6081
2 World Bank (2005) 586
3 World Bank (1990) 359
4 Groningen (2005) 953
5 Maddison (2003) 4078
6 IMF (2005) 93
7 Oxford (2005) 41
8 Country-speci￿c sources 903
9 Mitchell (2003a, b, c) 24
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